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Is the Minimum Wage a Pull Factor for Immigrants?
* 
 
This paper studies the impact of the minimum wage on immigration. A framework is 
presented in which inflows of immigrants are a function of the expected wage growth induced 
by the minimum wage. The analysis focuses on the US minimum wage increase of 1996 and 
1997, using data from the Current Population Survey and the census. The estimation 
strategy consists of using the fraction of affected workers as the instrumental variable for the 
growth of expected wages. The findings show that States in which the growth of expected 
wages was relatively large (around 20%) exhibit inflow rate increases that are four to five 
times larger than States in which average wages grew 10% less. Placebo tests confirm that 
the policy did not affect the immigration of high wage earners. 
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* I am grateful to Dan Hamermesh, Christian Schluter, Mirco Tonin, Jonathan Wadsworth and Jackie 
Wahba for useful comments. 1 Introduction
Does an increase of the minimum wage constitute a pull factor for low-skilled immigrants?
A minimum wage set in the receiving country has ambiguous eects on immigration: on the
one hand, average wages will increase; but on the other, employment perspectives might be
adversely aected. The objective of this paper is to explore this question in the context of the
increase in the US federal minimum wage that took place between 1996 and 1997.
There is extensive research about the determinants of immigration, and although it is dicult
to dene a taxonomy of these factors, there is a consensus that immigrants respond to both eco-
nomic and non-economic incentives in the receiving country. Relatively favourable employment
and wage conditions, along with the presence of network eects, distance from the origin coun-
try and immigration policies, are characterised as the principal causes of immigration (Clark
et al., 2002; Mayda, 2005). However, research on the role played by labour market institutions,
such as the minimum wage, is rather sparse. A minimum wage in the receiving country creates
a disequilibrium in the labour market, which may encourage or deter immigration. Economic
theory predicts a growth in the average wages of low-wage workers; employment eects are,
however, uncertain and depend on the labour market structure (Manning, 2003).
A simple model that relates the minimum wage to immigration is developed and used to estimate
the impact of the increase in the US federal minimum wage on the inows of low-wage workers.
The model postulates that migrants take decisions in terms of expected wages, whereby the
probability of nding employment is represented by the employment population ratio in the
destination country. The change in the minimum wage aects expected wages because it alters
both the average wage and the probability of employment. The eects of the policy are analysed
using the change in the US federal minimum wage that took place between 1996 and 1997, a
period during which both minimum wage impacts and immigration ows exhibited considerable
variation across 51 States1. The instrumental variable approach implemented in the analysis
can eectively be explained in two stages. In the rst stage the growth of expected wages is
regressed on the fraction of foreign-born individuals who earn between the old and new mini-
mum wage; in the second the predicted values are correlated with changes in the inow rate of
immigrants. The main results show that the $0.90 \top-up" in the minimum wage led to an
increase in the inow rate of low-wage immigrants that varies from less than 0.01% in States
with lower growth in expected wages to more than 0.08% in States where expected wages grew
the most. The robustness of these results is tested by including controls for macroeconomic
conditions in each State. Furthermore, placebo tests show that the policy did not aect the
inow rates of immigrants earning above the minimum wage.
The paper begins with a literature review of the minimum wage and immigration. The theo-
retical model and the econometric specication are outlined in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Section
2.5 provides a description of the data, followed by a factual illustration of immigration and the
minimum wage. Section 2.6 presents the results of the estimation along with robustness tests.
A brief discussion of the ndings and directions for future research conclude the paper.
1Including District of Columbia.
22 Minimum wage and immigration
2.1 The eects of the minimum wage
Theories about the eects of the minimum wage can be divided into two strands: researchers
who support the classical view, which builds upon the seminal model of Stigler (1946); and a
more recent literature strand known as the \new economics of the minimum wage" - named
after the inuential work of Card and Krueger (1995) - which contradicts the classical textbook
framework. The core dierence between the two views is the contrasting prediction in terms of
employment eects.
The neoclassical model predicts that under a binding minimum wage, rms are constrained to
pay higher wages than the market clearing level, and therefore employment would be reduced
to the point where the marginal revenue product of labour equals the minimum wage. At this
point, more individuals are willing to oer their labour in exchange for the minimum and this
determines the level of unemployment. Both wage and employment eects depend on the elas-
ticity of demand and supply. Advances to the classic model of the minimum wage date back to
the 1970s, when some interesting extensions were built upon the basic framework, such as the
introduction of an uncovered sector (Welch, 1974; Mincer, 1976). Recently, theoretical models
have become more structured, with the extension to heterogeneous labour, where the introduc-
tion of the minimum wage determines a truncation of the skill distribution (Brown, 1999).
Scholars of the new economics of the minimum wage argue that, due to the existence of frictions
in the labour market, moderate increases in the minimum wage may lead to non-negative em-
ployment outcomes. Markets may be imperfect because of rigidity in the labour turnover, and
the presence of mobility costs or asymmetric information (Manning, 2003). The simplest model
of imperfect competition is that of a monopsonistic labour market, with employers having some
market power in setting wages. Card and Krueger (1995) build upon the classical monopsony
framework and present a search model in which rms oer higher wages in order to discourage
turnover. Alternative models of equilibrium wage settings have been developed, but the gen-
eral implications of such models is that employment eects are not unambiguously negative as
predicted by the classical framework2.
The contrast in these theories is embodied in the empirical analyses of the minimum wage,
which are far from reaching a consensus on the employment eects. Most of these studies focus
on teenage workers, and although the target of the studies is always the same - the elasticity of
employment with respect to the minimum wage - the methodologies used vary substantially3.
For example, Card (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) use the fraction of aected workers to
assess wage and employment outcomes of the minimum wage. The fraction of aected workers
2A comprehensive study is carried out by Manning (2003).
3The literature focuses on employment rather than unemployment because the latter is thought to be
latent, since the minimum wage exerts, in the rst instance, an eect on the labour force participation.
If individuals are discouraged to enter or remain in the labour force, the unemployment eects would
understate the true eect of the policy. However, the analysis of the employment rate of particular
groups is a plausible measure for the labour market eects of the minimum wage, provided adequate
control for macroeconomic factors is taken. A comprehensive survey on the minimum wage is conducted
by Neumark and Wascher (2006).
3is dened as the proportion of a given population that earns between the old and new minimum
wage. Using cross-state observations from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period
just before and after the increase in the minimum wage, the authors show that the fraction
of those aected is a valid instrument to explain the \top-up" eect of the law in the average
wages of teenage workers. When used to predict changes in employment, the elasticity in most
of the cases is close to zero. Neumark and Wascher (1992) are among the rst to introduce a
state-year design: using observations from the CPS for the period between 1973 and 1989, they
nd negative values in the employment elasticity for teenagers (between -0.10 and -0.20) and
young adults (between -0.15 and -0.20). The results of their xed-eects model are robust to
several alternative specications. Using the same data, Card and Krueger (1995) demonstrate
that the ndings of Neumark and Wascher are sensitive to the inclusion of the proportion of
individuals enrolled in school. By claiming that the enrolment ratio should be excluded from
the estimation (since it depends on the minimum wage and not the other way round), they
obtain non-negative values for the elasticity. The studies described are the culmination of a
long debate about the eects of the minimum wage which still accompanies much of the recent
literature.
2.2 Linking minimum wage and immigration
One of the rst studies to explore the links between minimum wage and mobility is the two-
sector model of Harris and Todaro (1970), in which the minimum wage is used to explain the
persistence of high levels of urban unemployment in some developing countries. This framework
assumes that agents decide in terms of expected wages. Workers continue to migrate from the
rural sector until the urban expected minimum wage equals agricultural earnings; the excess
labour thus remains unemployed.
The only theoretical work which extends the Harris-Todaro framework to the context of interna-
tional migration is Basu (1995); similarly, the empirical literature that explores this particular
link is rather sparse. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that welfare benets are
likely to inuence the location choice of immigrants, as discussed by Borjas (1999) who shows
that immigrants are particularly responsive to welfare programs and that this can partly explain
the clustering of immigrants in a few States.
Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) is the only relevant study so far that investigates the
relationship between minimum wage and immigration. The authors explore the changes in
migration out of Puerto Rico as a consequence of the extension of the US minimum wage to
the island. They document that the minimum wage impact has substantially increased over
the years, reaching 60% of the average wage in 1987 (compared to less than 35% in the US).
By analysing migration and inter-industry employment patterns, the authors conclude that the
increase of the minimum wage induced a movement of low-skilled workers to the US, preventing
high levels of unemployment.
The framework presented in this paper somewhat contrasts that of Castillo-Freeman and Free-
man, in that the minimum wage is studied as a pull rather than a push factor. However, as
highlighted in their work, \[e]conomic analysis has no clear prediction about how the volume of
4migration might respond to higher minimum wages"4. This statement embodies the fact that
the eects of the policy are ambiguous; and hence, immigration could increase or decrease as a
consequence of the minimum wage. In the next section such ambiguous eects are cast into a
theoretical framework that links the policy with changes in immigrants' expected wages.
3 Theoretical framework
The key feature of the model is that potential migrants make decisions in terms of expected
wages, as in Harris and Todaro (1970). To keep the model as simple as possible, it is assumed
that potential migrants belong to two skill groups, high (h) and low (l) skilled. At any time,
high-skilled workers earn a wage above the minimum. The immigration ow to each State j at
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The term zjt represents characteristics of State j. The migration function has the feature that
F!(!;z) > 0. At each time, and assuming that the federal minimum wage a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It is plausible to assume that
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d  w = 0, i.e., the minimum wage will not aect the labour market
of high-skilled workers5. The eect of immigration on low-skilled workers will hence depend on
the magnitude and sign of
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Expression 3 is unambiguously positive only if
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@  w > 0. If this term is negative, the sign and the
magnitude depend on the relative impacts of the wage and employment eects. Note that this
condition can be rewritten as:
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< 1, i.e., the labour demand elasticity is less
than unity. The economic rationale is that the incentive to migrate induced by higher wages
might be oset by potential adverse eects on employment prospects.
4Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992, p.189) use this statement in the context of emigration. They
discuss that since an increase in the minimum wage implies both a reduction in employment and an
increase in wages, less-skilled workers are more likely to emigrate, while relatively more-skilled workers
are less willing to move.
5It is assumed for simplicity that Fl
! = Fh
!, i.e., low- and high-skilled workers react to changes in
expected wages with the same magnitude.
54 Econometric implementation
The model presented in equation 1 explains the relationship between the changes in immigra-
tion ows and the growth of expected wages. This relationship can be cast into an econometric
specication that uses variations across States:
mj
Pj
=  +!j +Zj +"j; (4)
where
mj
Pj is the change in the immigration inow rate, !j represents the growth in the
expected wages, and Zj is a set of covariates to control for changes in macroeconomic funda-
mentals of State j; "j represents a random component. The parameter of interest is , which
captures the sensitivity of the migration inows to the growth of expected wages.
Some observations about equation 4 are necessary. First, the specication uses dierences,
which has the advantage of removing xed eects that characterize each observational unit
(Dustmann et al., 2003). For example, if immigrants move to States with persistent prosperous
conditions or where immigrants from the same origin have previously settled, a regression of
immigration ows on the minimum wage could hide a spurious relationship or lead to an upward
bias in the estimates. Using rst dierences allows such persistent components to be ltered
out. Second, the term !j is endogenous. This is because the growth of average wages and
the employment population ratio are simultaneously determined by a change in the minimum
wage (Card, 1992), hence creating measurement error in !j. In addition, immigration ows will
lead to a simultaneity bias because they aect equilibrium wage and employment in the desti-
nation country. To solve this problem, the expected wages are instrumented by the fraction of
aected immigrants, i.e., immigrants who earn between the new and old minimum wage. Card
(1992) uses the fraction of aected teenagers because this is thought to be correlated with the
change in average wages, but exogenous to changes in employment. He obtains two reduced-
form equations for changes in wages and changes in employment. This paper builds upon this
methodology by combining wage and employment equations into a reduced form for changes in
expected wages as a function of the fraction of aected immigrants:
!j = a+Bj +j: (5)
It is shown in the Appendix that equation 5 is obtained by exploiting the additive property
of OLS. The term B represents the fraction of aected immigrants and  captures the causal
eect of the minimum wage on expected wages or, more precisely, the semi-elasticity of the
expected wages with respect to the fraction of aected workers. Equation 5 is the econometric
equivalent of equation 3, and it is important to note that the parameter  combines the eect
of the minimum wage on both the changes in average wages and the employment probability
in a given period. This can be decomposed into the two eects. Furthermore, it is shown
that  corresponds to the sum of the semi-elasticity of the two reduced-form equations used
by Card (1992) and a mathematical proof of the ambiguity of its sign is given, as previously
discussed. The third observation is that the model uses inow rates, i.e., immigration ows
6divided by the working population in each State before immigration. The use of a relative
measure acknowledges the fact that immigration inows are a function of the size of each State.
As a robustness check, results are also presented for the dierences in the level of immigration
inows.
A potential issue with the empirical analysis is the possibility that the policy is not exogenous
with respect to the macroeconomic conditions of each State. This would be the case of a State
minimum wage, where each government may decide to increase the level of the minimum wage
in response to some macroeconomic events (for example, very low wages for certain groups of the
population). Such a situation could lead to a spurious (perhaps negative) correlation between
immigration and minimum wage, because immigrants will tend to move, ceteris paribus, to
where wages are higher. This is the reason why the analysis focuses on the federal minimum
wage, the implementation of which can be thought to be exogenous to single State conditions.
5 Data description
This study focuses on the minimum wage increase that took place in 1996 and 1997. The
rst increase, from $4.25 to $4.75, took place in October 1996, followed by an increase to $5.15
in September 1997. The data used come from the monthly CPS for the period 1994 to 1999 and
from the 1990 and 2000 censuses. Information on wages, employment status, unemployment
and the fraction of aected immigrants is extracted from the CPS. This sample yields a total
of more than 10,000,000 individual observations. This enormous amount is required because
immigrant cases average just 10% of the total sample, and wage and employment information is
collected only for the outgoing rotation groups (one sixth of the total). Since a limited amount
of observations would create noise when deriving observations at the State level, data is pooled
over the two years before and after the increase of the minimum wage. Each year starts in
October and ends in September6. Sample weights are applied to ensure the data is nationally
representative.
From the CPS it is possible to derive dierent measures for hourly earnings. In this paper
two measures of hourly wages are used, which are referred to as actual and constructed hourly
wages. The actual hourly wages are derived using responses of individuals who report an hourly
wage and are paid by the hour7. The constructed State hourly wages are obtained using in-
formation on the weekly wages of workers paid at a frequency dierent from hourly and usual
hours worked in a week. This measure is likely to be noisy, since both denominator and numer-
ator are measured with error; however, it produces a larger amount of information. Since the
eect of minimum wage is measured with higher precision with the actual hourly wages, these
will be used as a benchmark in the estimation. Robustness tests will include the results using
6This particular timing allows the exact period to be captured before the increase of the minimum
wage (October 1996). The period after the increase is computed here from October 1997, although
the second part of the increase in the minimum wage took place in September. This is done to allow
comparability with the period before the increase and to rule out potential seasonal eects.
7In unreported results the analysis has also been carried out to include respondents who report an
hourly rate but are paid at a dierent frequency. Inferences are substantially identical.
7constructed hourly wages as well. All wages below $1 are excluded; values greater than $30
and $40 are removed for the actual and constructed wages, respectively. This procedure results
in fewer than 1% of observations being censored, and it helps in moderating the measurement
error. The growth of wages is dened as the dierence of the log average wage before and after
the increase of the minimum wage. The fraction of aected immigrants corresponds to the por-
tion of immigrants (over the total reporting wages) who earn between the old ($4.25) and new
($5.15) federal minimum wage in the period before the increase. The employment population
ratio is dened as the proportion of employed immigrants of the working-age immigrant popu-
lation in each State. This excludes those aged over 64 and under 16, but includes individuals
enrolled in school. The growth of employment is dened as the dierence in the log of the
employment population ratio. The growth of expected wages is then dened as the product of
the growth of wages and the growth of employment. CPS data are also used to compute wage
and unemployment changes for the group of prime-age natives in each State, which are used as
control variables in some of the specications.
Data from Census 2000 are drawn from the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples. These are used
to compute immigration ows before and after the increase of the minimum wage. Flows before
the increase include individuals who immigrated to the US between January 1995 and December
1996, while ows after the increase contain immigrants who entered the USA between January
1998 and December 19998. Flows include only those who report earnings and are classied
depending on their hourly wage, which is obtained by dividing the reported earnings by the
hours worked in a year9.
Since ows are likely to be measured with some error, three dierent \treatment" groups are
dened: I) earnings between $4.25 and $6.50; II) earnings between $4.25 and $7.15; and III)
earnings between $3.75 and $5.65. Group I is considered the benchmark for the analysis, since
it includes all individuals who earn between the old minimum wage and the highest State min-
imum wage. The lower bound of $4.25 accounts for the presence of sub-minimum wages or
imperfect compliance. The upper bound of $6.50 is set to include individuals who migrated
because of the federal minimum wage but who, after immigration, earn a State minimum wage
which is higher than the federal rate and thus binding at the moment of the census10. Group
II consists of all individuals of group I and of immigrants who might be aected by spillover
eects. The upper bound of the group is set at $2 above the federal minimum wage and hence
captures potential \ripple" eects for individuals who earn a wage that is already 40% higher
than the minimum. Group III includes a wage \window" of $0.50 below the old minimum oor
and $0.50 above the new one11.
8Census data can only be categorized by calendar year. This creates a slight mismatch between CPS
and census. However, three months is a plausible gap if immigrants tend to respond to minimum wage
changes with a lag because of, for example, a delay in the circulation of information.
9The hours worked in a year are calculated using average hours worked in a week and the weeks
worked in a year.
10By the end of 1999 the State minimum wage in Massachusetts was $5.25; in Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware and Rhode Island $5.65; in California and Vermont $5.75; and in Oregon $6.50. The Appendix
reports the value of the State minimum wage and the dates when the law was introduced.
11Robustness checks have also been conducted on the group with earnings between $4.65 and $5.65
(i.e., $0.50 above and below the new threshold). Results are very similar to those for Group III.
8Three more groups are created, which include individuals who earn between: IV) $6.51 and
$9.00; V) $9.01 and $14.00; and VI) $14.01 and $30.00. Each of these groups corresponds to
roughly one third of the total ows of immigrants who earn wages higher than individuals above
group I and are used to implement placebo tests.
Finally, data from Census 1990 come from the tables computed by the USA Census Oce and
are used to construct variables for the historical immigration used in some specications.
5.1 Facts about minimum wage and immigration
Table 1 presents the characteristics of dierent groups in the period before the minimum
wage increase. The rst row reports the fraction of aected workers, dened as the proportion
of individuals earning between the old and new minimum wage. Around 15% of the total pop-
ulation earns wages between $4.25 and $5.14. When compared to other studies (e.g., Cortes,
2004), this share is relatively high: the reason is that the hourly wages used here are those
reported from hourly workers, as this is thought to better capture the impact of the policy.
Table 1: Characteristics of minimum wage earners before the 1996/7 increase
Immigrants Total Women Blacks Hispanics Teenagers
population
Fraction of aected workers 19.24 15.40 17.99 18.41 22.48 51.68
Hourly wages 8.41 9.25 8.44 8.61 7.95 5.35
Percentage less than high school 41.16 19.02 15.79 18.53 45.06 58.75
Working experience 17.62 16.04 16.57 16.48 15.20 0.22
Weekly hours worked 35.03 33.28 31.07 34.03 34.93 21.53
N 14,914 141,715 74,215 17,786 12,896 14,675
Source: monthly CPS October 1994 to September 1996. Sample weights are applied. Data refer to individuals
aged 16 to 64 who report wages. The group of Blacks also includes mixed groups; Hispanic population
corresponds to respondents indicating Hispanic origin, and may be of any race. Potential working experience
is calculated according to educational attainment as follows: age minus 17 if less than 10th grade; age minus
18 if between 11th grade and High School Diploma; age minus 19 if some college; age minus 20 if associate
degree; age minus 22 if bachelor's degree; age minus 24 if above bachelor's degree.
Immigrants have a relatively high share of aected individuals (above 19%), which is slightly
larger than women and Blacks, but slightly smaller than Hispanics (above 22%). Teenagers
have the largest share of aected workers (above 50%); this is not surprising given the fact
that most young workers under 19 years are employed in industries where the minimum wage
is commonplace. Dierences in the proportion of aected workers are reected in the hourly
wages of these groups. On average, immigrants earn slightly less than women and Blacks, but
roughly $0.50 more than Hispanics. The hourly rate for teenagers is the lowest, and corresponds
to around 60% of the population average. Part of the gaps in the share of aected workers and
in the hourly wages is attributed to dierent levels of education. If one excludes teenagers -
since only a small share of them have completed secondary education - the groups of immigrants
9and Hispanics have the largest share of individuals with educational attainment lower than high
school. This proportion is much larger than those of other groups, such as women and Blacks.
In terms of working experience and hours worked, however, immigrants report a value slightly
larger than other groups (except teenagers, who have basically zero working experience).
In the period under consideration, the share of aected workers diers substantially across the
51 States. This can eectively be seen from Figure 1, which represents the proportion of immi-
grants who earn between $4.25 and $5.15 in each State.
Figure 1: Fraction of aected immigrants in the 51 States
Source: CPS. Digital boundaries from http://www.Census.gov/geo/www/tiger/index.html.
In all States of the Northeast region and the Pacic (Alaska and Hawaii), the fraction of aected
workers is under 10%. The Midwest region is rather heterogeneous, and shares do not exceed
20% except in two states (North Dakota and Kansas). Similarly, there are dierences in the
West region, with values that are, in general, higher than in the Northeast and Midwest. The
region with the highest percentage is the South, where the majority of States have a fraction
of aected immigrants above 20%. There are several elements that determine these dierences.
For example, States in the South have generally lower wages than the remaining areas in the US;
and States in the West have higher immigration of low-wage workers than in the Northeast and
Midwest. The fraction of aected immigrants represents a functional predictor for the impact
of the change in the minimum wage. To have a preliminary understanding of the magnitude of
the policy, it is useful to compare wages of immigrants before and after the increase. This is
done in Figure 2, which represents the kernel wage densities for immigrants in the two periods;
the vertical lines indicate the minimum wage before October 1996 and after September 1997.
The portion of the density shown in blue contained between the vertical lines represents the
nationwide proportion of aected immigrants.
Although the wage distribution does not exhibit the classic \spike" at the minimum wage level,




























Figure 2: Kernel density of wages before and after the minimum wage increase
Source: CPS October 1994-September 1996 (before) and CPS October 1997-September 1999 (after).
the eect of the policy is quite substantial. This is evident from the erosion of the lower part
of the wage distribution and the consequent ripple eect that shifts the density to the right.
The average wage of immigrants increased from $8.41 before the change to $9.42 after the new
minimum wage was set. Assuming that in the period under scrutiny, the minimum wage was
the only determinant of wage growth, the policy determined an increase of around 12%. For
comparison, wages of teenagers grew by about 16% in the same period. This is due to the fact
that a larger fraction of teenagers gained from the minimum wage increase, which led to a larger
increase in the average hourly wage.
It is insightful to describe what happened to immigration patterns before and after the change
of the minimum wage. In the 1990s, as in the previous two decades, immigration to the US
increased substantially (Clark et al., 2002). The fact that recent immigrants have tended to
concentrate in a few locations where previous immigrants have settled is well documented (Bar-
tel, 1989). However, in the 1990s immigration became less focused and immigrants began to
diuse to a wider range of locations, as is shown in the case of Mexican immigration studied by
Card and Lewis (2005). This process of diusion can be observed through the dynamics of the
ows across States.
Table 2 reports the immigration ows before and after the change of the minimum wage both
nationwide and for the top 12 destinations12. Entries in the left-hand panel refer to immigrants
of group I (i.e., low-wage workers), while the right-hand panel reports gures for the total of
groups IV, V and VI (i.e., higher-wage workers). For each skill group, the change in the in-
ow rate (i.e.,
mj
Pj ) is reported. Although the inows of both groups increased by about the
same amount (90,000 individuals), the dynamics were substantially dierent. The inow rate of
low-wage workers in the top ve States (which are also the major immigration ports of entry)
12These States represent more than 70% of total ows in both periods and roughly 53% of the total
working-age population before the minimum wage increased.
11increased at a rate similar to the national average, except for New York, where there was a
decline of 0.01%. Flows of higher-wage individuals in the top ve States, on the other hand,
increased by less than the national rate, with the exception of Illinois. In particular, there was
a substantial decrease in the ows to New York. The small increase of the inow rate in the
top destinations was balanced by the relatively large growth in other destinations. The growth
of the inows in four States (Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Virginia) accounted
for around one third of the nationwide increase.
Table 2: Immigration in the top 12 destination States, by selected groups
Group I Groups IV, V and VI
State Working-age Flows in Flows in  inow Flows in Flows in  inow
pop in 1995 1995/96 1998/99 rate (%) 1995/96 1998/99 rate (%)
USA 166,126,915 273,055 360,879 0.053 905,724 996,417 0.055
California 19,966,667 63,895 75,999 0.061 169,467 173,519 0.020
Texas 11,940,420 35,373 41,814 0.054 84,650 88,466 0.032
New York 11,569,819 28,915 27,730 -0.010 101,368 87,926 -0.116
Florida 8,631,746 28,118 33,227 0.059 84,895 83,187 -0.020
Illinois 7,477,960 14,599 18,308 0.050 50,528 55,811 0.071
New Jersey 5,070,594 11,800 14,575 0.055 45,696 47,163 0.029
Georgia 4,667,591 8,050 14,142 0.131 30,356 41,184 0.232
North Carolina 4,567,214 6,797 13,971 0.157 23,401 31,786 0.184
Virginia 4,243,680 4,505 6,831 0.055 21,637 27,675 0.142
Massachusetts 3,887,229 4,470 6,590 0.055 27,080 34,080 0.180
Washington 3,462,704 4,794 7,474 0.077 20,886 22,912 0.059
Arizona 2,587,427 8,252 11,585 0.129 20,349 21,793 0.056
Source: ows from Census 2000; population derived from CPS October 1994 to September 1996.
Sample weights are applied. Flows before the minimum wage change refer to years 1995 and 1996; ows
after the change refer to years 1998 and 1999. All ows consist of immigrants aged 16 to 64 who report
earnings in the census.
6 Analysis
This section presents the results of the estimation; the subsections report the estimates for
the rst stage regression (Subsection 6.1), for the second stage (Subsection 6.2) and for the
robustness checks (Subsection 6.3).
6.1 Estimation of the growth of expected wages
The results from the rst stage regression are represented in Figure 3, which plots the growth
of expected wages against the fraction of aected workers, along with the regression line and
its 95% condence interval. The graph also reports the labels of largest immigration States and
potential outliers.
The slope of the line - which represents the estimate for  - is 0.445 (s.e. 0.110). The explana-
tory power of the fraction of aected is substantial, given the fact that the R2 is about 0.25.
The graph demonstrates that the larger the fraction of aected immigrants, the larger, ceteris
12paribus, the growth of expected wages. Using the additive property of OLS, it is possible to
isolate the contributions of the fraction of aected on the wage and employment growth, which
are presented in Figure 4. The results of the estimation of equation 5 are given in this subsec-
tion. This corresponds to the rst stage where the growth of expected wages is regressed on
the fraction of aected immigrants. Throughout the analysis, regressions are weighted by the
stock of immigrants in each State, which controls for the precision with which observations are
measured. Unweighted results are also presented.














































Figure 3: Weighted regression plot of equation 5

















































































Figure 4: Wage and employment growth and fraction of aected immigrants
The slopes for wage and employment growth are 0.309 (s.e. 0.087) and 0.140 (s.e. 0.076) re-
spectively, which means that an increase in the fraction of aected immigrants of 0.1 implies a
growth of 0.031 for wages and 0.014 for employment. The wage growth overstates the growth
of wages in the economy (16.3%) and can be attributed to spillover eects. The result for
employment growth indicates that in the period under consideration, the minimum wage had
positive eects on the employment of immigrants. This result is comparable with the study for
consequences on teenage employment by Card and Krueger (1995), although their estimates are
13somewhat smaller. One explanation is that wages of immigrants are aected by factors omitted
in the simple regression. Hence, in Table 3, a series of alternative specications is presented.
Column (a) reports the estimates of the parameter  for the benchmark case just outlined.
Specication (b) is the unweighted regression of model (a); the estimates are 12 percentage
points larger than the benchmark. From Figure 4 it can be seen that by ignoring weights, the
wage contribution would be much larger, yielding a higher slope. A comparison of the measures
of t suggests that the benchmark model is preferred, as it attributes less weight to outlying
observations.
Table 3: OLS regression of expected wage growth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Fraction a. 0.449*** 0.578*** 0.488*** 0.444*** 0.434*** 0.415*** 0.413***







Constant 0.082*** 0.058 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.105*** {0.206* {0.194
(0.022) (0.037) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.103) (0.126)
R2 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.36
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signicant at 1%; ∗∗ signicant at 5%; ∗ signicant at 10%. The
reported coecient refers to the fraction of aected immigrants. All models, except (b), are weighted by the
stock of foreign-born population in each State. The macroeconomic controls are all measured in terms of their
growth.
Model (c) uses constructed hourly wages, resulting in a coecient four points larger than in (a).
This is explained by the fact that although the average growth of constructed wages is slightly
smaller than that of actual wages (10% vs 12%), the average fraction of aected immigrants is
substantially smaller (14% vs 19%); hence, the coecient needs to be larger to explain the wage
growth.
Models from (d) introduce macroeconomic variables to control for unobserved changes in the
economy that could be omitted by the benchmark case. These are the growth of unemploy-
ment rate and native wages in each State and the growth of the regional Consumer Price Index
(CPI)13. Only the CPI is statistically signicant in explaining the wage growth of immigrants,
but this does not substantially aect the estimate of , even when the control variables are
jointly estimated. Interestingly, while the growth of the unemployment rate has the expected
sign, the wage growth of natives is negative, although it becomes essentially zero when all con-
trol variables are included.
The results presented above robustly support the fact that the increase in the minimum wage,
as measured by the fraction of aected immigrants, leads to a substantial growth of expected
wages. This large increase is attributable to the fact that in the period under analysis, the
13Historical CPI data are from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. The values of this index are only available
for the four macro regions: West, Midwest, Northeast and South.
14minimum wage did not have negative eects on employment. The estimates imply a labour
demand elasticity of 0.30, which is directly comparable with the value of 0.45 derived from the
specication in the study by Card and Krueger (1995) which is mostly similar to the one in
Table 3. The Appendix reports the derivation of this elasticity.14.
6.2 Estimation of the change in immigration ows
In this section the second stage of the model is estimated. This corresponds to estimat-
ing regression equation 4, with the growth of expected wages instrumented by the fraction of
aected workers. The aim is to obtain an estimate of the coecient , which measures the
sensitivity of the change of the migration inow rate with respect to the growth of expected
wages.
Before presenting the results of the regression, it is useful to illustrate the problem of endogene-
ity and the need for using the instrumental variable approach. In Figure 5, the relationship
between the growth of immigration inow rate and the expected wages is presented. On the
left is the expected wage growth as calculated from the data (and hence endogenous); on the
right is the predicted values from the rst stage. In both graphs the regression line and its 95%
condence interval along with the 95% prediction bands, are shown. The graphs reveal that if
the endogenous variable were used, the relationship would be basically non-existent. However,
the relationship becomes positive when the predicted values of the growth of expected wages are
used, with an estimate of  of about 0.005 (s.e. 0.002). These estimates are insensitive to the
exclusion of the outliers represented by the observations outside the 95% prediction interval.
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Figure 5: Change in the immigration inow rate and growth of expected wages
To better understand the economic impact of the estimates, some examples are useful. The
average increase in the inow rate for the wage group I is 0.052%. In States such as Maine,
where the predicted growth of expected wages is 10%, the immigration inow, as tted by the
14The value of 0.46 can be derived from the estimates contained in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.4
panel B, page 128 of Card and Krueger (1995).
15regression line, is relatively low (the change was 0.017%). In States such as California, where
wages grew by about 19%, the regression line predicts an inow rate change of 0.062%. This
means that 9 percentage points of growth in expected wages contributed to an inow rate change
that is 0.045% larger. In other words, if the expected wages in California had grown by only
10%, there would have been, ceteris paribus, an inow of about 3,000 low-wage immigrants
against the actual 12,000.
The results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 4 for all models presented in
Table 3 and for additional specications. For illustration purposes, all estimates and standard
errors, except those in column (h), are multiplied by a factor of 100. The comparison of
columns (a), (b) and (c) reveals that the unweighted estimates yield a smaller coecient than
the benchmark case; whilst using the measure for constructed wages produces a larger value.
However, the introduction of macroeconomic controls does not substantially change the value
of the estimates, as can be seen from the models (d) to (g). It is interesting to note that while
the wage growth of natives is an important factor in explaining cross-states dierences in the
change of the inow rate, the growth of unemployment rate and the CPI are not, although they
both have the expected sign. In columns (h) and (i) the specications for the immigrants in
the wage groups II and III are presented. The reported value of  for group II is larger than
the benchmark case. Since the upper limit of this group is $2 larger than the federal minimum
wage, it is possible that the presence of spillover eects also attracts immigrants who earn above
the minimum wage. Consistently, the coecient for group III is smaller than that for group
I. This can be explained by the fact that the minimum wage window is narrower (the upper
limit is $5.65), and this would exclude all immigrants who were earning the State minimum
wage at the moment of the census15. Column (j) includes the concentration of immigrants in
1990, dened as the stock of foreign-born divided by the population in each State at the time
of the 1990 census. The rationale of adding this variable is to control for the presence of time-
varying, migration-related eects that are not captured by using rst dierences. The estimate
of  is actually larger than the benchmark case. The coecient for the historical immigration
concentration is negative, although not signicant. At rst sight, the negative sign might appear
a strange result, considering the tendency of new immigrants to move to where previous foreign-
born populations had settled. However, it is important to recall that the dependent variable in
question is the change in the inow rates. This means that ows grow relatively more in locations
where immigration was historically lower.16. This is also documented by Card and Lewis (2005)
who nd that Mexican immigrants (who represent the largest share of low-wage immigrants)
progressively settle away from traditional immigration gateways. Finally, in column (k) inows
rather than inow rates are used in a regression without weights17. It is clear the estimates
are not comparable with those of the previous models, but they do constitute a robustness test
which demonstrates that even without controlling for population size, the results are similar.
15For example, California has had a minimum wage of $5.75 since March 1998.
16On the other hand, ows are highly correlated with historical stocks. For example, a regression of
the inow rate after the minimum wage change (i.e.,
mj1
Pj1 ) on the 1990 immigration concentration would
yield an R2 over 0.40.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17The table also reports the values of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity.
The null hypothesis is that the OLS estimator is consistent (under the assumption that the
instrument is valid). The test is carried out by augmenting the second stage regression with the
residuals of an ancillary regression in which the endogenous variable is regressed on all exogenous
covariates (including the instrument). If the parameter accruing to the residuals is signicantly
dierent from zero, then the null hypothesis is rejected. As can be seen, the hypothesis that
OLS is consistent is strongly rejected in all specications.
6.3 Placebo tests
A counterfactual analysis of the previous results can be obtained by testing the eect of the
policy on groups thought to be excluded by the treatment. This section presents placebo tests
using the wage groups IV, V and VI. These are groups formed by immigrants who earn a wage
higher than the minimum; and hence, other factors, such as the change in macroeconomic char-
acteristics, are expected to explain cross-state dierences in their inow rates. The regressions
below present the results for models with and without control variables.
The results consistently demonstrate that the growth of expected wages - as instrumented by
the fraction of aected immigrants - is not signicant in explaining the change in the inow rate
of immigrants with earnings higher than the minimum wage. However, the growth of prime-age
native wages is very important in explaining the change in the inow rate for groups IV and V,
while unemployment is very important for VI. In addition, the CPI has the expected sign only
for group IV, but none of the estimates is signicant.
Table 5: Placebo tests (coecients × 100)
Group III Group IV Group V
Expected wages growth {0.058 0.011 0.073 0.106 0.092 0.064
(0.156) (0.141) (0.160) (0.169) (0.146) (0.145)
Unempl. {0.013 {0.025 {0.087***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.028)
Wages 0.620*** 0.379** 0.128
(0.135) (0.163) (0.140)
CPI {0.001 0.002 0.010
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Constant 0.000 {0.000 {0.000 {0.001 0.000 {0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 51 51 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signicant at 1%; ∗∗ signicant at 5%; ∗ signicant at
10%. The reported coecient refers to the growth of expected wages. All models are weighted by
the stock of foreign-born population in each State. The macroeconomic controls are all measured
in terms of their growth. See text for a denition of the wage groups.
7 Discussion and nal remarks
This paper studies an unexplored aspect of the minimum wage: its pull eect for immi-
grants. The investigation of the relation between migration and the minimum wage is of par-
ticular relevance in the context of recent socio-economic events that have occurred in the US.
18The immigrant population rose systematically during the 1990s, and as of 2000 the share of
immigrants exceeded 11% of the total population18. Parallel to these events, the history of
minimum wage legislation has also experienced remarkable changes: after a steady decline in
the 1980s, the two increases in 1991 and 1992, and 1996 and 1997 have contributed to returning
the real value of the minimum wage to the level of 1980.
There are two main ndings in this study: rst, the minimum wage in the period under con-
sideration has contributed signicantly to the increase of the average wages of immigrants. In
addition, there seems to have been a positive eect on employment, and this result supports
the hypothesis that there are frictions in the labour market which can be alleviated through
the policy. These positive eects on the labour market outcomes have increased the gains that
potential immigrants can attain by an average of 15% (as measured by the increase in the ex-
pected wages). The second result is that low-wage immigrants are responsive to the growth of
expected wages. This quantity, as instrumented by the fraction of aected workers, robustly
predicts cross-section dierences in the change of inow rates. Groups of immigrants who earn
more than the minimum wage are instead insensitive to the expected gains produced by the
policy.
There is much more to learn about immigration and minimum wages. The empirical analysis in
this paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment consisting of an exogenous change in the policy,
and hence is focused on the federal minimum wage. However, changes in the federal law are
quite rare; and hence, future studies that wish to examine this relation should concentrate on a
panel data design which contains data both across States and over time, as conducted in previ-
ous studies investigating unemployment eects on teenagers (Burkhauser et al. 2000; Neumark
and Wascher 1992). This approach would have two advantages: rst, the cross-State data in
recent decades have been enriched by the presence of many States which have set their own
minimum wage and have dierent immigration dynamics. The panel data design will be useful
to accurately control for State xed eects. Second, minimum wages eects are also interesting
when the nominal wage does not change. The model in this paper predicts that the erosion of
the nominal value will lead to a decrease in the expected wages of immigrants. Analysing the
consequences on immigration from a decline in the real minimum wage is an interesting question
to be explored in light of the fact that the federal minimum had been the same for nearly 10
years19. This study will hopefully provide a useful prescription for a better planning of policies
related to immigration and the minimum wage. The paper demonstrates the existence of an
important relationship, and policies intended to cope with the growing concentration of foreign-
born, such as the monitoring of migration levels and the provision of social services, should take
into consideration the fact that the minimum wage is an important asset for low-wage earners,
capable of inducing them to move from one country to the next.
18Data from Census 2000. In terms of civilian population, the CPS reveals that this gure is just above
10%, due to dierent denitions.
19The federal rate was recently increased with a new minimum wage bill which established a three-stage
increase: $5.85 after July 2007; $6.55 after July 2008; $7.25 by August 2009. This corresponds to an
increase in the nominal wage of more than 40%. However, during the past decade several States passed
laws that introduced a rate higher than the federal: in 1997 only 7 States adopted their own minimum
wage; by 2006 this number was 18.
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21Appendix
a) Derivation of equation 5







j are the log dierences of average wages and employment population ratio,
respectively. Following Card (1992), the equations for labour demand and the reduced form for










j is exogenous and hence can be used to estimate ws
j; the predicted value is then
inserted in the equation for the change in employment to obtain:
es













b) Derivation of elasticity



























c) Sign of 
Appendix a) shows that  depends on  and ; however, the sign is ambiguous. This is because,
although the minimum wage has unambiguous positive eect on the average wages (i.e.,  > 0),
its sign depends on .
If  < −1, i.e., in the elastic part of the demand curve, expected wages decrease because the
negative eect on employment more than compensate the positive benets in terms of wage
dierentials.
If −1 <  < 0, the expected wages react positively to an increase in the minimum wages, but the
increase of  will be slowed down, i.e.,  < .
22If  ≥ 0, the positive eect of employment amounts to that of wages. This only happens if
employment changes are not demand-constrained, i.e., are measured along the supply curve, as
in the case of monopsonistic labour markets.
d) Mechanism of the fraction of aected immigrants
For illustration, and following the analysis that Card (1992) conducted for the teenagers, con-
sider how much of the wage increase to comply with the new minimum wage is predicted by
the fraction of aected immigrants. The average wage in the economy after the minimum wage
change is $5.23. This value is larger than the federal minimum wage because during the period
under consideration some States passed a law that increased the minimum wage to a value
higher than $5.15 and thus this weighted average takes into account the dierent times of the
introduction of state and federal laws. The average wage of minimum wage immigrant workers
in the period 1994 to 1996 was $4.71; in order to comply with the new average minimum wage,
average wages had to increase by 11%. Since the average fraction of aected immigrants was
about 19%, one would expect wages to grow by 0:11×0:19 = 2:09%. Instead, the growth of aver-
age wages was 11.75% (from $8.41 to $9.42); average wages grew for other reasons, but at least
in the short run, one can assume that these causes were not State-specic. If so, they would have
been absorbed by the constant of the reduced form regression of wage growth on the fraction
of aected workers. As shown in the text, the regression of equation A3 for wage growth yields
a coecient of the fraction of aected of about 0.31; by multiplying this result by the fraction
of aected immigrants, one obtains a prediction of wage growth equal to 5.89%. This overes-
timates the \expected" increase by a factor of 5:89~2:09 = 0:31~0:11: = 2:82. This is somewhat
higher than the value found by Card (1992), i.e., 0:15~0:088 = 1:70. This over-prediction can
be ascribed to several factors: inspection of the data reveals that this overestimate is partially
attributable to spillover eects.
e) States with dierent levels of the minimum wage
State Minimum wage Date of introduction
Alaska 5:65 Sep 1997
California 5:75 Mar 1998
Connecticut 5:65 Jan 1999
Delaware 5:65 May 1999
Hawaii 5:25 Jan 1994
Maine 5:25 Jan 1997
Oregon 5:50 Jan 1997
6:00 Jan 1998
6:50 Jan 1999
Rhode Island 5:65 Jul 1999
Vermont 5:25 Jan 1998
Washington DC 6:15 Jan 1998
23